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IS THE HOSPITALITY INDUSTRY MORE LIKELY TO REPRICE STOCK 
OPTIONS? 
 
 
Basak Denizci 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Hospitality companies are known to be sensitive to the economy and movements in the 
market. When overall performance of the company is poor because of a market wide fall, 
hospitality managers should not be panelized for the decrease in the stock price. In such 
cases, it is acceptable to reprice the stock option to realign the incentives and to minimize 
the agency problem. This paper examines whether repricing of hospitality firms are more 
likely to reprice options after a stock price decrease that is accompanied by a market wide 
fall. Although the overall results are consistent with prior literature, the hypothesis is 
marginally supported.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
Repricing refers to setting a new, lower exercise price for stock options readily 
available, because the stock price has fallen since the original award. More specifically, 
repricing makes sure that the executive gets paid and continue to increase their personal 
wealth no matter what happens to the market price of company’s stock which eliminates 
a lot of risk for the executives. Although the repricing of stock options is not a very 
common phenomenon, when it happens it attracts a lot of attention from the press and 
professionals. Companies usually reprice to restore the power of managers’ option based 
incentives when the company stock price decreases significantly due to the market wide 
fall or poor industry performance (Chen, 2004; Chance at al., 2000). Repricing of stock 
options is criticized in general because it is seen as a mechanism to reward the managers 
for poor performance. 
This study examines the repricing issue in the hospitality industry. The hospitality 
industry sets itself apart from other industries in that it is very sensitive to the economy, 
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and it is intensely leveraged. Hotel establishments also have real estate components 
attached, which makes them capital intensive. They operate in extremely competitive 
markets and are considered to be high risk/high reward investments 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Global Hospitality and Leisure Services, 2002).  
Repricing issue has never been explored for the hospitality firms although the 
performance of this specific industry is very dependent on the market movements. Mostly 
related to the hospitality industry, Rogers (2003) examined the repricing events of casino 
companies between 1993 and 1998. He concluded that repricing helps casino firms to 
decrease excessive risk taking incentives of executives. Hospitality Sales & Marketing 
Association International's (HSMAI) announced the "Top 10 Issues of Concern" facing 
sales and marketing executives and staff with the number one issue being the current 
economic situation (Khan, 2004). This information was gathered from a survey that was 
sent to 7,000 members of HSMAI. Many articles in the press draw attention to the hotel 
and restaurant industry’s sensitivity on economic developments. The main theme of these 
articles is that strong economy helps hotels enjoy robust health and good profits and it is 
time to invest in lodging. However, weak economy pulls the stock prices down 
significantly (for example, The Washington Post (March 2, 1997), Wall Street Journal 
(August 18, 1999), Chicago Tribune (January 20, 2000), Hotel and Motel Management 
(January 15, 2001)). The intuition behind the arguments of the press and industry 
professionals is that, in an economic downturn, people would be less likely to travel and 
spend their money on travel related expenses such as staying in a hotel and participating 
travel related activities. In addition, dining out is among the first things that people 
consider cutting down when they need to save. Even amount of corporate travel decreases 
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when the economy is not in a good state. On the contrary, people do not mind spending 
their money on staying in hotels and dining out in the times of robust economy. These 
economic movements and their consequences are obviously not in the control of the 
management.  
Overall performance of the company may go down just because of the market 
wide fall, which is out of managers’ control; and hospitality managers should not be 
penalized for the decrease in the stock price. Thus, this paper will examine whether the 
hospitality firms are more likely to reprice options after a stock price decrease that is 
accompanied by a market wide fall compared to a matched sample of non-hospitality 
firms.  
This paper proceeds in the following format. Background information on stock 
options and options pricing are presented in Section 2. Section 3 explains the data 
collection and the related tests. Results of the study are explained in Section 4. Section 5 
provides the conclusion. 
 
2. Background information and previous research on stock options and option pricing 
2.1 Stock Options 
Corporate governance is concerned with the system by which businesses are run. 
This system includes the executive’s responsibility to ensure that the business is 
appropriately and honestly managed. One of the challenges of powerful corporate 
governance is to minimize the agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). According 
to the agency theory, CEO behavior is mostly unobservable. Given this constraint, an 
optimal pay contract should be closely linked to company’s performance (Miller, 1995; 
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Akhigbe, Madura and Tucker, 1995; Madura, Martin and Jessel, 1996, Attaway 2000). 
Offering stock options is one of the ways to decrease agency problem. Other popular 
mechanisms such as presence of board of directors, threat of takeover also exist to 
minimize the potential conflict of interests between the shareholders and managers.  
Granting stock options to CEOs helps to line up the incentives of the executives 
with the interests of shareholders (Kerr & Bettis, 1989, Hall & Liebman; 1998). Most 
U.S. companies award stock options once a year. A compensation committee gives the 
decisions on the size and timing of the stock option awards. This committee is usually 
composed of the board of directors. (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1988). A stock option 
grants the CEO right to acquire shares at a specific price (exercise price) at a later date. 
More than 90% of large U.S. companies issue stock options and executive stock options 
are about 60% of total CEO compensation (Deshmuhk, Howe, Luft; 2002). 10 years is a 
typical time to expiration on the award date.  
After the connection between company’s performance and optimal CEO contract 
has been established, some other studies found positive effect of performance on pay 
(Sigler and Porterfield, 2001; Core, Holthausen and Larker, 1999; Guay, 1999; Lambert 
and Larker, 1987; and Joyce, 2001). However, CEO compensation is not always tied to 
the firm’s performance. Sometimes CEOs are getting paid well even though they fail to 
achieve positive results (Behr, 1997). In good states of the economy, firms can achieve 
good results without much effort, which eventually results in high pay levels.  
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2.2 The Repricing Provision 
A stock option provision typically changes the exercise price of old options and/or 
cancels old options and reissues new options following a stock price decrease. Repricing 
can be often seen as a tool to reward the employees for their poor performance (Chance, 
Kumar, Todd; 2000). But there is a rational explanation behind repricing the stock option. 
Some of the incentive effects might be lost to the CEO, which increase the agency 
problem, after a sharp decrease in the stock price (Dalton and Dalton, 2005). Also, 
employees should not be penalized because of a decrease in the stock price that is not 
traceable to their actions. In such a situation, compensation committee can review the 
situation. Usually, executives also demand their options to be repriced. Considering that 
around 60% of the CEO compensation is related to the stock options, it is reasonable to 
believe that CEOs and top-level executives would raise their voices to the board of 
directors and/or compensation committee for a change in the exercise price of old 
options. It is up to the board of directors and/or compensation committee to make the 
ultimate decision given that repricing provision is not a part of the original contract 
(Corrado, Jordan, Miller, and Stansfield, 2001). According to Dalton and Dalton (2005), 
offering stock options is necessary to motivate the new top management team. However 
option repricing does not meet its stated purpose which is aligning the concerns of the top 
executives with those of shareholders.  
Repricing of stock options has been a controversial subject since the early 1990’s. 
Many articles in the business, professional, and popular press have attacked the practice 
(For example, USA Today (April 29, 1997), The Wall Street Journal (October 29, 1997), 
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The New York Times (July 15, 1998).) There are two different points of view on 
repricing. Some claim that repricing is a useful means of restoring incentives and 
retaining executive talent since the incentives related to the stock options will lose their 
meaning with a deep decline in the stock price. Some others believe that repricing stock 
options is solely rewarding the employees for their poor performance. Thus the 
companies should stay away from using repricing provision. Shareholders and 
institutional investors are among the opponents to the repricing provision while managers 
and executives obviously support it.  
The academic research on repricing in general concentrates on the characteristics 
of the repricing firms.  Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) found that the repricing firms 
significantly underperformed the market for six years until the repricing date. Saly (1994) 
stated that option grants increased significantly after the market crash. However the 
increase in the option grants is greater for those firms whose stock fell by the largest 
percentage. Brenner et al. (2000) showed that the likelihood of repricing is more for 
smaller firms and for firms with poor performance. Chance at al. (2000) stated that the 
repricing firms have greater agency problems, they are smaller in size and they have 
insider-dominated boards. Chidambaran and Prabhala (2003) found that the firms that 
choose to reprice are younger and more likely to have smaller boards. Chen (2004) 
provided evidence that firms with less stockholder control are more likely to maintain 
reprice flexibility.  Callaghan et al. (2004) examined the timing of option repricing and 
reported that repricings are timed to coincide with the release of good news or bad news 
about the company. For example, managers who expect favorable earning reports, reprice 
before the announcement. Similarly, the managers who anticipate unfavorable earning 
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reports reprice after the announcement. In addition, Callaghan et al. (2004) calculated 
that repricings boosted executives' pay by an average of nearly $500,000 each. Evidently, 
taking advantage of the company information systematically helps the executives to 
increase their personal wealth.  
New accounting treatment came into effect on December 15, 1998. As a part of 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) interpretation No. 44, companies are 
required to expense to earnings any consequent stock price approval above the new 
exercise price.  
2.3 Research Purpose 
 The purpose of this study is to investigate whether hospitality firms are more 
likely to reprice options after a stock price decrease that is accompanied by a market wide 
fall. 
2.4 Research Hypothesis 
Given that hospitality industry is considered to be very sensitive to the economy, 
it can be argued that when economy turns, hotels and restaurants do poorly in general. 
However, this is not executives’ fault so s/he should not be punished (e.g. in terms of 
lower rate of increase in her/his compensation in the following period). Given this 
condition, the following hypothesis has been developed: Hospitality companies are more 
likely to reprice options after a stock price decrease that is accompanied by a market wide 
fall compared to a control sample of non-hospitality companies that are matched on size 
and stock price decrease. 
 
3. The data and methods 
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Firm level data was collected from Compustat database for the years from 1993 to 
2003. Hospitality sample includes hotel companies (SIC 7011) and restaurant companies 
(SIC 5812). It is required that all firms in the sample are covered in CRSP and Compustat 
databases.   
   To obtain repricing of stock options, 2003 proxy statements in U.S. Security 
Exchange Commission (SEC) database were examined. In 1993, SEC started to require 
the firms to provide any kind of repricing information in their proxy statements. Proxy 
statements are designed to give a voting shareholder all the information necessary to 
make an informed decision. According to the SEC, if a firm reprices in 2002, it must 
provide a ten-year history detailing any previous repricings for at least the CEO and four 
highest paid executives (Chance et al., 2000). However, checking one proxy statement in 
2003 was not enough to collect the information of any instances where companies 
decided to reprice executive stock options. Chance at al. (2000) reported that about one-
third of the firms in their sample did not mentioned repricing in their proxy statements in 
spite of SEC regulation. Taking this into consideration, two other databases (LexisNexis 
and Mergent Online) were employed to identify the firms with repricing policies.  
Keyword research was used to identify the option repricing information between 
1993 and 2003. Keyword research involves rational combinations of terms related to 
repricing such as “eliminate”, “prohibit”, “restrict”, and “authority” with terms such as 
“reprice”, “lower”, “cancel”, “reset” (Chen, 2004). Since numerous combinations have 
been used to retrieve repricing related information, it is likely that all the references and 
news related to repricing have been attained.  
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After examining more than 130 firms in hotel and restaurant sector, 14 companies 
and 15 repricing events were obtained. Only one restaurant company (Good Times 
Restaurants) has two repricings, all the others have just one repricing. Among the 
hospitality companies with repricing policies included in this study, 2 are hotel 
companies and 13 are restaurant companies. The hotel companies that repriced are 
Sholodge and Interstate Hotels and Resorts. The restaurant companies that repriced are 
Ark Restaurants, Buffets Inc., Checkers Drive-in Restaurants, Denny’s, Good Times 
Restaurants, Landrys Restaurants, Lone Star Steakhouse Saloon, Meritage Hospitality 
Group, New World Restaurant Group, Roadhouse Grill, Shells Seafood Restaurants, 
Shoney’s, Repricings took place between years 1995 and 2001.  
It appears that 9 repricing occurred before December 15, 1998, all others occurred 
after this date. On December 15, 1998, new accounting treatment for priced options 
(FASB Interpretation No. 44) came into effect. It can be argued that after this provision 
came into effect, companies would be even more careful when they are making repricing 
decisions as it may end up affecting companies’ earnings significantly. Some hospitality 
companies included the explanation in their proxy statements that their earnings can get 
affected to a serious extent from the repricing provision as a reason not to reprice the 
stock options (such as Applebees and Darden ). Note that most number of pricing (5 
repricings) occurred in 1997 for hospitality companies in the time frame between 1993 
and 2003. Year 1997 was used to test the hypothesis of this study.  
 
3.1 Matched sample  
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A control sample of firms that are similar in size and in prior year’s stock return 
were constructed for the year 1997. I excluded financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and 
utilities (SIC 4900- 4949). Firm sales are taken as a proxy for size. To be included in the 
sample, a firm’s sales should be within 70-130% range of hospitality companies’ sales. 
Among those selected firms, firms with closest prior stock return to the hospitality 
company’s stock return in the sample were selected for matched sample. Data for 
matched sample was also collected from CRSP and Compustat databases. In the sample 
set, there were 103 hospitality and 103 non-hospitality companies. Among the hospitality 
companies, 5 of them repriced stock options in 1997. Among the non-hospitality 
companies, 2 of them repriced stock options in 1997.  
 
3.2 Research Model 
To test the hypothesis that hospitality companies are more likely to reprice 
options after a stock price decrease that is accompanied by a market wide fall compared 
to a control sample of companies that are matched on size and stock price decrease, the 
model below is tested using logistic analysis:  
Likelihood of Repricing = β0 + β1PSF + β2SIZE + β3LEV + β4DUM 
 
Repricing = Repricing is 1 if the company repriced in 1997 and 0 otherwise.  
 
Prior Stock Performance (PSF) = For the companies that repriced in 1997, prior stock 
performance is prior year’s stock return. For those that did not reprice, lowest 1-year 
return during year 1997 is measured as prior stock performance.  
 
Firm size and firm leverage are used as control variables.  
 
Firm Size (SIZE) = Prior literature shows that small firms are more likely to reprice 
(Chidambaran and Prabhala, 2003). Natural logarithm of 1997 sales is taken as a proxy 
for the firm size.  
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Leverage (LEV) = Total debt / Total shareholders’ equity in 1997. 
 
Hospitality Dummy (DUM) = Hospitality dummy is 1 for hospitality companies and 0 
otherwise.  
 
4. Results 
4.1 Performance of the stock around the repricing event 
Event study approach has been employed to examine whether the market reacts in 
any way to the public announcement of hospitality firms' repricing. Percentage abnormal 
returns and corresponding t-statistics for 14 repricing events are shown in Table 1 for a 
window of ± 5 days around the proxy filing date. Date 0 is the filing date. Data for one 
company could not be obtained from CRSP database. Abnormal return is the company 
return in excess of market return. Both value and equal weighted CRSP NYSE-AMEX-
NASDAQ indexes were used for the market factor.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
It appears that there is no significant market reaction to the public announcement 
of repricing except 4 days after the announcement using abnormal return on equal-
weighted index and 1 day before the announcement using both value-weighted and equal-
weighted indexes. T-statistics even for the significant days are barely statistically 
significant at 0.05 level (t-statistics are just above 2.00). This implies that the investors 
may not be monitoring proxy filings carefully. In addition, proxy statements are very 
technically written. It may be the case that the investors do not spend the time to go over 
the details of this technical report. Also note that the major press covered only 3 
repricings out of 15 events. So investors did not have the chance to read all the repricings 
in the news. Alternatively, it is possible that the market does not observe repricing events 
 12 
in the hospitality industry as important information about the future performance of the 
firm.  
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 contains descriptive statistics of the companies that repriced in 1997 2 
years prior to and 2 years after the event.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Market capitalization decreases from 1995 to 1996 which implies that the stock 
prices of these companies have been decreasing for while and the decrease does not stop 
on the repricing year and continues through 1999. Earnings per share, which is calculated 
by dividing company’s profit by its number of outstanding shares is negative in years 
between 1995 and 1999 with a decreasing trend every year. Return on equity ratio 
indicates that repriced companies have been performing poorly. The level of leverage 
used by these companies also keeps on increasing and it seems that the repriced firms 
keep on increasing their debt levels. Sales show an increasing trend in general.  
 
Table 3 illustrates the comparison of repriced and non-repriced companies in 
terms of firm size, performance measures, leverage and stock returns for the event year 
(1997).  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Market capitalization rate, which is measured multiplying closing stock price in 
1997 by the number of shares outstanding in 1997, is statistically significant. T-statistics 
of –3.081 and the mean values of repriced versus non-repriced companies imply that size 
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of the repricing firms are significantly smaller than the non-repricing companies.  It can 
be argued that size effect is related to the information and data availability about the 
small firms. For example, small firms might be less known firms and it might be easier to 
reprice stock options for these firms compared to the big firms with large number of 
shareholders. This finding is also consistent with the previous research (Brenner et al, 
2001; Chance et al., 2000). Stock price return is significantly less for repriced companies 
during 1997. Examining the mean values, repriced companies have an average return of -
32.25% whereas the non-repriced companies have an average return of 5%. Dividend per 
share is on average $0.00 for the repriced companies and $0.20 for non-repriced 
companies. T-statistics for this variable is also statistically significant. All other variables 
on Table 3 are not significant. Performance measures such as earnings per share and 
profit margin are lower for repriced companies compared to non-repriced companies in 
1997. However, the difference is not significant. It is apparent but not surprising that 
repriced companies’ financial performance is considerably lower than those of non-
repriced companies. The explanation is very simple and intuitive. Stock options may have 
become “under the water” or “out of the money” as the stock prices decrease, and it is 
more likely that repriced companies’ stock price also decreased along with their stock 
returns and dividends per share. Thus, it makes more sense to restore value to underwater 
options, which are virtually worthless, by setting a new exercise price for the stock 
options. On the other hand, leverage ratio does not seem to differentiate repriced and non-
repriced companies.  
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To identify whether the repricings were indeed following a market wide fall, the 
return on market during 1997 was observed. I used CRSP NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ 
indexes as a proxy.  
[Insert Graph 1 here] 
As it is illustrated in Graph 1, occurrence of market wide decreases is during 
March, August and October in 1997. Referring to the repricing dates of hospitality 
companies in 1997, it seems that repricings took place in months of February, April, 
May, July and December. It seems that not all the repricings follow the market wide fall. 
This provides some evidence that the executives of hospitality companies might be 
indeed being awarded for their poor performance.  
 
4.3 Who is more likely to reprice? 
Logistic regression estimates the probability of repricing event occurring in year 
1997 given the above independent variables. The results of the analysis are presented in 
Table 4.    
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Pseudo R-squares for the model are 0.082 for Cox & Snell R-square and 0.310 for 
Nagelkerke R-square. Only statistically significant variable is the prior stock performance 
and all other variables included in the analysis are not significant. Exp(B) in the table 
above denotes the odds ratio. The coefficients in logistic regression are in terms of the log 
odds, that is, the coefficient 0.049 implies that a one-unit change in prior stock 
performance results in a 0.049 unit change in the log of the odds. The fact that only 5 
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hospitality companies repriced in 1997 and only 2 non-hospitality companies in the 
matched sample repriced may have some influence on this insignificant result of size, 
leverage and hospitality industry dummy variables. In the light of the regression analysis, 
hypothesis that the hospitality companies are more likely to reprice options after a stock 
price decrease that is accompanied by a market wide fall is rejected.  
 
5. Research Limitations 
This study can be considered as a preliminary investigation into repricing of stock 
options in the hospitality industry. The empirical analysis for the most parts of this paper 
was done for year 1997. It could provide more insight if this study was done considering 
a longer time frame. Corporate governance the system by which organizations are 
directed and controlled. In a corporate system, boards of directors are responsible for the 
governance of their organization. In this respect, this paper is further limited by not 
including other factors that may affect the repricing decision in a company such as the 
size of the board, the presence and/or influence of the CEO on the board of directors, and 
level of stockholder control.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This industry specific study builds on the previous literature regarding repricing 
of stock options and makes a contribution to the existing hospitality management and 
repricing literature. Furthermore it attempts to explain the occurrence of repricing for the 
hospitality companies given the industry’s specific characteristics. The motivation of the 
study is based on hospitality industry’s sensitivity to the market and to the economic 
movements. When the stock price decreases as a result of market wide or industry wide 
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fall, the hospitality managers should not be punished in terms of lower compensation. 
Since the executive pay contracts are highly dependent to the stock options, a sharp 
decrease in the stock price significantly affect their compensation.  
 There was marginal support for the hypothesis that, the hospitality companies are 
more likely to reprice options after a stock price decrease that is accompanied by a 
market wide fall compared to a control sample of companies that are matched on size and 
stock price decrease. Examining 5 days before and 5 days after 14 repricing events, there 
was not any sign of reaction to the public announcement of the events. The fact that only 
3 of the 15 repricing events are covered in the press and technical nature of the proxy 
statements might have an effect on this. When the financial characteristics of the 
repricing companies in 1997 are observed 2 years prior to and 2 years after the event 
year, it appears that these firms continue to perform poorly after the event year. 
Comparison of the companies that choose to reprice in 1997 and those who did not 
choose to reprice indicate that repricing firms are significantly smaller in size (in terms of 
market capitalization), and have lower stock price return, dividends per share.  
Overall, this paper makes an attempt to explain the repricing events in the 
hospitality industry. Although I found support that firms reprice after a significant stock 
price decrease, there is not enough evidence to support that the hospitality companies are 
more likely to reprice after a sharp stock price decrease. The research suggests the need 
for more studies on repricing of stock options in the hospitality industry. 
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Table 1: Percentage Abnormal Returns and Corresponding t-statistics for 14 Repriced 
Firms 5 Days Before and 5 Days After the Announcement Date 
 
Day 0 is the filing date. The CRSP NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ index is used for market 
factor. 
 
Relative day 
Value-weighted 
index     
Equal-weighted 
index   
               
  Percentage  t-statistic  Percentage  t-statistic 
    abnormal return     abnormal return   
-5  0.026  1.457  0.023  1.288 
-4  0.008  0.591  -0.023  0.490 
-3  -0.001  -0.075  -0.036  -0.199 
-2  -0.005  -0.349  -0.035  -0.201 
-1  0.050  -2.455  -0.051  -2.499 
0  0.006  0.457  0.060  0.542 
1  0.030  1.669  0.027  1.506 
2  0.014  1.803  -0.005  1.419 
3  -0.005  -0.649  -0.009  -1.131 
4  -0.020  -1.902  -0.020  -2.040 
5  0.032  1.482  0.028  1.284 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for 7 Repriced Firms in 1997 
 
Selected measures of performance and leverage from annual accounting data 2 years 
prior to and 2 years after event year are presented. Year 1997 is the repricing year. The 
mean and standard deviation are presented. Data are obtained from Compustat. 
 
 
  1995   1996   1997   1998   1999 
    Mean  St. Dev   Mean  St. Dev   Mean  St. Dev   Mean  St. Dev   Mean  St. Dev 
EPS  -0.53 1.31  -1.22 2.82  -1.14 2.40  -0.50 1.12  -0.01 0.73 
ROA (%)  -4.52 13.58  -10.60 17.11  -13.63 21.53  -8.61 13.24  -2.24 9.62 
MC ($MM)  310.03 161.45  229.48 207.88  196.10 237.29  139.04 191.61  130.34 146.25 
LEV (%)  31.67 300.17  45.90 201.24  54.27 156.88  62.27 288.74  167.83 326.74 
SAL ($MM)  297.99 372.45  362.47 403.12  393.41 449.47  401.66 432.35  396.77 404.33 
                                
EPS=Earnings per share, ROA=Return on Assets, ROE=Return on Equity, MC=Market Cap,   
LEV=Leverage, SAL=Sales             
N=7                
$MM = Millions of dollars             
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Repriced and Non-Repriced firms in 1997 
 
Selected measures of performance and leverage from annual accounting data is presented 
for year 1997. Mean comparisons and t-statistics are provided. Data are obtained from 
Compustat files.  
 
 Repriced Non-Repriced t-statistics 
        
Sales ($MM) 393.41 710.10 -1.437 
Earnings per Share -1.14 0.36 -1.619 
Dividends per Share 0.00 0.20 -6.339 
Profit Margin (%) -10.68 -4.14 -0.905 
Stock Price Return (%) -32.25 0.05 -2.968 
Market Capitalization ($MM) 196.10 909.57 -3.081 
Leverage (%) 54.27 52.60 0.160 
        
$MM = Millions of dollars    
Reprice Companies: N = 7     
Non-Reprice Companies: N = 199    
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Table 4: Logistic Analysis 
 
Logistic analysis output is presented. Dependent variable is repricing. Repricing is 1 if 
the company repriced in 1997 and 0 otherwise. Independent variables are PSF, SIZE, 
LEV and DUM. (PSF) = For the companies that repriced in 1997, prior stock 
performance is prior year’s stock return. For those that did not reprice, lowest 1-year 
return during year 1997 is measured as prior stock performance. (SIZE) = Natural 
logarithm of 1997 sales is taken as a proxy for the firm size. (LEV) = Total debt / Total 
shareholders’ equity in 1997. (DUM) = Hospitality dummy is 1 for hospitality companies 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
 Coefficient Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
          
PSP -3.016 4.552 0.033* 0.049 
SIZE -0.474 0.930 0.260 0.623 
LEV -1.114 0.079 2.081 0.892 
DUM 0.001 0.100 0.067 0.969 
Constant -4.468 20.259 0.000* 0.011 
          
* significant at 0.05 level    
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Graph 1: Monthly Returns on NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ Indexes in 1997 
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VWRETX: Value weighted CRSP NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ indexes 
EWRETX:  Equal weighted CRSP NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ indexes 
 
 
 
